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THE INS AND OUTS OF FILING A CLAIM
UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
PHILIP SILVERMAN*
N 1946, CONGRESS enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) .' For the first time in our history, a judiciary remedy
was available to compensate victims of the negligence or miscon-
duct of government employees acting in the scope of their employ-
ment. The FTCA provided a one-year statute of limitations and
an optional administrative procedure.' In 1949 the FTCA was
amended to extend the statute of limitations to two years," and
again in 1966 to require the administrative claim procedure!
Prior to the 1966 amendment, the filing of an administrative
claim was an option available to the claimant, but no claim in
excess of $2,500 could be filed. Once a claim was filed, the claimant
was barred from filing a suit until the government rejected the
claim in writing or the claim was withdrawn from consideration
on fifteen days' written notice. If the claim was withdrawn or re-
jected during the two-year limitation period, suit could be com-
menced up to the expiration of that period. If the limitation period
* Mr. Silverman is associated with Speiser, Krause & Madole, in Washington,
D. C., and Speiser and Krause, P.C., in New York City.
The author is a graduate of Brooklyn Law School, LL.B., 1949; LL.M., 1951,
and is admitted to practice in the District of Columbia, Virginia and New York.
From 1960 to 1962, he served as an Assistant U. S. Attorney in the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York. He then joined the Department of Justice in Washington,
D. C., and from 1962 to 1972 specialized in defending the Government in aviation
cases throughout the United States. He served as Chief of the Aviation Litigation
Unit from 1970 to 1972.
1Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 845 (1946).
3 Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 843 (1946).
428 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976).
528 U.S.C. § 2672 (1976). The amendment became effective on January 18,
1967, the 20th anniversary of the effective date of the original act. Pub. L. No.
89-506 § 10, 80 Stat. 309 (1966).
e L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 3.06 (Supp. 1979).
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expired during the time the claim was under consideration, how-
ever, the claimant had six months from the time the agency mailed
a notice of rejection or from the time of withdrawal. When suit
was commenced, the ad damnum could not exceed the amount for
which the administrative claim was filed.'
The Statute of Limitations
The 1966 amendments incorporated important changes into the
claims procedure, which in turn substantially influenced the statute
of limitations. Under the new procedures, the filing of an ad-
ministrative claim became mandatory and a condition precedent
to filing an action. Presently, it is the claim which is required to
be filed within the two-year period previously available for the
filing of actions The statutory period is not tolled by the minority
of the claimant.9 Once the agency rejects the claim, however, an
action must be commenced within six months of the date of mail-
ing the rejection, even though the six-month period ends prior to
the expiration of the two-year limitation period for filing claims."
In the event the government fails to act on the claim within
six months, the claimant may, at his option, treat such failure to
act as a final denial and commence an action any time thereafter."
Under such circumstances, the six-month limitation applicable
when a claim is denied in writing does not apply, and in effect,
an open-ended statute of limitations exists." Should the agency,
prior to commencement of any suit, forward such a denial letter,
a six-month limitation period would commence from the date of
such letter, no matter when sent."
7 Id. at § 3.05.
' Kelley v. United States, 568 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
106 (1978); 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
ISmith v. United States, 588 F.2d 1209, 1211 (8th Cir. 1978); Pittman v.
United States, 341 F.2d 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965);
Childers v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 539, 542 (S.D. Tex. 1970), afl'd, 442 F.2d
1299 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971).
10 Childers v. United States, 442 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
857 (1971); Claremont Aircraft Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 896 (9th Cir.
1969); Rodriguez v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 1 (D.P.R. 1974); 28 U.S.C. 5
2401 (b).
11 Kelley v. United States, 568 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
106 (1978); 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
1 Kelley v. United States, 568 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
106 (1978); 28 U.S.C. 5 2675(a).
1328 U.S.C. § 2401(b); 28 C.F.R. 5 14.9 (1978).
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The filing of an action' presupposes that a valid administrative
claim has been timely presented to the interested agency in ac-
cordance with the regulations. The assertion of an appropriate
administrative claim is jurisdictional and no principle of waiver
or estoppel can operate against the government with respect to
this jurisdictional prerequisite.' Nor does the government's failure
to plead the statute of limitations, when an action is brought out
of time, act as a waiver of the defense, since the time limitations
set forth in the statute are jurisdictional and may not be waived."
Indeed, it may even be raised by a court sua sponte."' With the
amendments to the FTCA, new regulations governing the pro-
cedures for filing administrative claims were promulgated" and
amended but once.' These regulations govern the content and
manner of filing such claims' and should be consulted before
undertaking the filing of a claim against the United States."'
Presenting a Claim
When filing a claim, it is preferable to use the Standard Form
95, a government-issued form for administrative claims. The
regulations provide, however, that claims may be presented by
"other written notification," which can be a letter or even a tele-
11 A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. FED.
R. Civ. P. 3.
11 Powers v. United States, 390 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1968); Martin v. United
States, 436 F. Supp. 535, 537-38 (S.D. Cal. 1977); Mayo v. United States, 407
F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (E.D. Va. 1976); Driggers v. United States, 309 F. Supp.
1377 (D.S.C. 1970).
16 Perkins v. United States, 76 F.R.D. 593, 595 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
11 Lien v. Beehner, 453 F. Supp. 604 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
Is 28 C.F.R. § 14 (1978).
1935 Fed. Reg. 314 (1970); 28 C.F.R. S§ 14.2, 14.9.
'Regulations have the force and effect of law. Federal Corp. Ins. Co. v.
Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Caton v. United States, 495 F.2d 635 (9th Cir.
1974); Ianni v. United States, 457 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1972); Pringle v. United
States, 419 F. Supp. 289, 291 (D.S.C. 1976). Section 14.2(a) has been held to be
a valid regulation. Muldez v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Va. 1971).
"' Some agencies have their own regulations governing the filing of adminis-
trative claims which should be consulted. In most cases however, they are
virtually identical to the regulations issued by the Department of Justice, 28
C.F.R. § 14, which are discussed here. See, e.g., Post Office, 39 C.F.R. § 912.1
-.15 (1978); Veterans Administration, 38 C.F.R. 5 14.600-.608 (1978); Air
Force, 32 C.F.R. § 842.100-.112 (1978); Navy, 32 C.F.R. S 750.30-.40 (1978).
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gram." The claim must be received within two years and must
contain the appropriate information."
The statute provides that a claim is barred unless it is pre-
sented in writing to the appropriate federal agency within two
years?' The regulations also provide that a claim is deemed pre-
sented when "a Federal agency receives" the claim, and if a
claim is directed to the wrong agency, "that agency shall transfer
it forthwith to the appropriate agency. ' Thus, in a case involving
a midair collision which occurred on June 17, 1972, depositing a
claim in a mailbox on June 17, 1974, addressed to the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) office in Los Angeles, and to the
United States Attorney for the Southern District of California
(San Diego), was not considered the equivalent of receipt by a
federal agency, or filing within the two-year period. 6 The court held
that the post office was acting as agent for the plaintiff for trans-
mission of the claim and not as an agency for the United States
or the FAA for the purpose of receiving administrative claims:
"Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that ... depositing an envelope
in a mailbox is equivalent to receipt by a federal agency, much
less 'presentment' within the meaning of the controlling statutes."'
The court equated the word "presentment" in the statute, at a
minimum, with the equivalent of filing." The implication is clear,
however, that if the claim is timely filed under the regulations, it
is presented even when received by the wrong agency, which must
then transfer it to the correct agency."
The regulation requires only the completion of a Standard Form
95 or other written notification of the incident from the claimant
or his duly authorized agent or legal representative, with a claim
for a sum certain for the injury to or loss of property, personal
injury or death.' The mere notice of an accident, however, is
2228 C.F.R. 514.2(a) (1978).
2328 U.S.C. 5 2401(b) (1976); 28 C.F.R. S 14.2(a) (1978).
228 U.S.C. S 2401(b) (1976).
228 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1978).
26Steele v. United States, 390 F. Supp. 1109 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
2TId. at 1111.
28 Id. at 1112.
2928 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1978).
3 Id.
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insufficient to satisfy the administrative claim requirements," and
filing a lawsuit does not meet the requirements of presenting a
claim." Once the claim is filed the claimant "may be required"
to submit additional information pertaining to the claim, in
accordance with the regulations." The failure to comply with such
requests for this additional or supplemental information needed
to process the claim can be considered a failure to file a proper
claim, and result in dismissal of the subsequent action."
Who May File
The most serious problems generated in the preparation of
claims seem to involve the identity of the claimant, his duly
authorized agent or legal representative, and the failure to state
a sum certain. The regulations also define who may file an ad-
ministrative claim." For example, a claim for personal injuries
may be presented by the claimant, his duly authorized agent, or his
legal representative." While it would seem a parent or guardian
could act as agent for a minor or incompetent, since each is under
a disability, the designation of a guardian by a minor or incompe-
tent is subject to question, and whether the agency is "duly
authorized" could be disputed." The Ninth Circuit held, however,
that parents may present claims on behalf of minor children if
the names of the children are included in the claim." Where no
prejudice results to the government, courts have manifested a "ju-
dicial unwillingness" to permit the United States to stand on
technicalities once a claim is fied, particularly when the rights
of minors are involved and inequity would result.' In Stokes v.
31 House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d 609, 615-16 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Silver Dollar Mining Co. v. PVO Int'l Inc., - U.S. _
99 S. Ct. 182 (1978); Avril v. United States, 461 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1972).
" Best Bearings Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1972);
Peterson v. United States, 428 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1970); Meeker v. United
States, 435 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1970).
"28 C.F.R. 5 14.4 (1978).
"Cummings v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mont. 1978); Rothman
v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 13, 17 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
-28 C.F.R. S 14.3 (1978).
*Old. at § 14.3(b).
"'House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d at 617-18.
3I Id. at 618.
"Stokes v. United States, 444 F.2d 69 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1979]
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United States,' the court permitted a suit by a minor for injuries,
notwithstanding the fact that the parents had settled their claim
for the medical expenses incurred." In Locke v. United States,"
the husband of the deceased wife filed a claim seeking $250,000
for personal injury and failed to name his three minor daughters.
The court rejected a motion to dismiss the claims of the minors,
finding no prejudice to the government.'
Many problems have arisen with claims for wrongful death
where the regulation provides that a claim may be presented by
the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate, or "any
person legally entitled to assert such a claim in accordance with
applicable State law." In a recent multiple death litigation stem-
ming from a mine disaster in Idaho, the court held claims filed
by a mother to be valid, since the parent has inherent authority
to represent the interests of a minor child and since the parent of
a minor child is a person legally entitled to assert a claim for
wrongful death in accordance with Idaho law. ' In Pringle v.
United States" the claim was filed by the father for his minor son's
estate, but he did not qualify as administrator until five days before
the action was commenced. The court ruled that since he was
not the executor or administrator at the time of filing the adminis-
trative claim, and South Carolina law required that a death action
be brought in the name of an administrator or executor, the claim
was a nullity." Although the plaintiff contended that the case re-
quired a liberal reading and application of the law, and that he had
complied with the spirit, if not the letter, of the law, the court
rejected this argument, citing with approval from Gunstream v.
United States,' "Congress in enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act
1002 (1971); Young v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 736 (D. Ga. 1974); Locke
v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 185 (D. Hawaii 1972).
40444 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1971).
41 Id. at 70.
4'Locke v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 185 (D. Hawaii 1972).
1 Id. at 187.
"28 C.F.R. § 14.3(c) (1978).
4' House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d at 618; 28 C.F.R. § 14.3(c)
(1978).
1419 F. Supp. 289 (D.S.C. 1976).
4 7 Id. at 291.
4 307 F. Supp. 366, 369 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
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was impinging on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The condi-
tions put upon the exercise of the privilege created called for literal
interpretation of the procedure for filing an administrative claim
and the time limitations applicable thereto." 9
In Van Fossen v. United States?0 the court distinguished between
the bringing of a claim and the bringing of an action. The govern-
ment insisted that the claim, filed by the California resident parents
of a stewardess killed in the crash of a TWA jet near Dulles Air-
port in Virginia, was not asserted "in accordance with the applic-
.able State law [of Virginia]," which provides for a death action
to be brought by an administrator or executor as personal repre-
sentative of the estate. The government's argument was viewed as
suggesting "that the words 'bring an action' be used interchangeably
with the words 'assert a claim' in regulation 14.3 (c)."' The court,
however, pointed out that the government had presented no author-
ity to support that construction and stated, "A claimant who lacks
the capacity to bring a wrongful death action in a state court may,
nonetheless, be entitled to assert a claim in those courts for a part
of the proceeds recovered. Such is the case in Virginia. ' The
court then emphasized that the Virginia Code provided that dam-
ages in death actions be distributed to the surviving spouse, chil-
dren, and grandchildren, but if none survived, to parents, brothers,
and sisters. Although the suit had to be brought by a representa-
tive, the representative was acting not for the general benefit of
the estate, but rather as a trustee for certain surviving kin of the
decedent, designated in the statute.58
The approach in Van Fossen appears to be sensible in light
of the government's own regulation. Although it is provided that
a personal injury claim may be presented on behalf of a claimant
by a duly authorized agent or legal representative, a first reading
of section 14.3(c) tells us that in a death action only a person
"legally entitled to assert such claim in accordance with applicable
state law" is entitled to present a claim. Section 14.3 (e), however,
specifically sets out the procedure for presenting a claim by "an
41 Pringle v. United States, 419 F. Supp. 289, 292 (D.S.C. 1976).





JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
agent or legal representative" and requires that the claim, when
presented in the name of the claimant and signed by an agent
or legal representative, must also show the title or legal capacity
of the person signing, and should be accompanied by evidence of
authority to present a claim on behalf of the claimant. The regula-
tion then enumerates the various persons who may in fact sign the
claim as "agent, executor, administrator, parent, guardian, or
other representative."' A fair reading of section 14.3(e) suggests
that even in a death case, an agent, parent or guardian, or other
representative, such as a next friend, as well as an executor or
administrator, may be able to present the claim on behalf of the
person legally entitled to assert the claim. Indeed it would seem
that with proper authorization, even an attorney may sign and
present a claim on behalf of an executor or administrator who may
in fact be the legal claimant. This is supported by the decision in
House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co.,' in which the circuit court
remanded the case to determine whether the attorney, who had
signed certain administrative claims, had authority to act as agent
for the claimants.'
When one considers that the avowed purpose of the claims pro-
cedure is to spare the courts the burden of trying a case by afford-
ing the government an opportunity to consider settlement of a
claim, " the issue, at least in Pringle, seemed narrowed to a ques-
tion of technicalities." Of what great importance was it that the
father of the deceased minor child made the claim as a father,
and not as administrator of the deceased child's estate, if the gov-
ernment was in fact notified of the purpose of the claim and the
facts from which the claim arose? There was no claim of prejudice
by the government in Pringle, and no indication that the govern-
ment was prevented from properly considering the claim merely
because the father filed as father and not as administrator. The
court in Van Fossen noted the same issue, stating:
5'28 C.F.R. § 14.3(e) (1978).
-573 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1978).
5Id. at 617-18.
57 House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d at 616-17 n.7; Robinson
v. United States Navy, 342 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1972); [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2516.
5"419 F. Supp. 289, 290-91 (D.S.C. 1976).
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Likewise, in this case, the fact that plaintiffs' names and not that
of a personal representative appeared on the face of the com-
plaint in no way hindered the government's desire to settle the
claim or its efforts to prepare a defense on the merits. In fact,
were the government to pursue either course of action, one of the
first steps that it would have to undertake would be to ascertain
what survivors are entitled to claim under the Virginia statute.
Furthermore, even if plaintiffs had procured a Virginia personal
representative, under the Regulations, that representative would
have had to present the claim in the name of the claimant. Thus
the government can in no way contend that it was surprised or
deceived in its pretrial deliberation. In short, the expediting func-
tion which Congress envisioned as the role of the administrative
procedure was not impeded here."
In some states wrongful death actions may be brought by the
surviving spouse in his or her own behalf, and on behalf of minor
children.'" In these states an administrative claim filed on behalf
of the decedent's estate by an executor or administrator may be
considered a nullity, unless some authorization is shown to have
been granted to the personal representative to file on behalf of
the individuals entitled to recover. 1 Claims filed by the surviving
spouse of a deceased minor which included claims by adult chil-
dren were held to be invalid."'
It is clear then that the wrongful death act of a state must be
carefully examined to determine what rights exist and to whom
they belong. When an accident occurs which involves more than
one jurisdiction, the choice of law principles of the state where the
act or omission occurred must also be taken into consideration.
To those who wonder why Virginia law appeared to govern the
filing of a claim by Californians, it should be remembered that
under the FTCA, the liability of the government is to be de-
termined in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred," which means the whole law of that state
[the place where the act or omission occurred], including its con-
59 Van Fossen v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 1017, 1023-24 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
See also House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d at 609 n.8.
6OSee, e.g., Maryland, Art. 3-904(d), 3-904(e); Md. R. P. Q40-Q44.
11 House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d at 617-18; 28 C.F.R. 5
14.3(e) (1978).
12 House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d at 617-18.
"328 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
19791
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flicts law." This principle governs the meaning of the phrase "in
accordance with applicable State law.""5 Thus in Van Fossen, the
court in California was required to apply Virginia law since under
that law, the law of the place of the accident governs."
The question of who should file an administrative claim and the
status of certain derivative claims are also important in considering
who may file a claim. In some jurisdictions, the right to a deriva-
tive cause of action is separate and apart from the main claim."
Thus, a spouse's claim for loss of consortium, or a claim for
medical expenses incurred by a parent on behalf of a minor child,
or a spouse, may be personal to the claimant, though the claims
may depend on the injured person's right to recover." The incor-
rect assessment of everybody's rights may result in the barring of
a valid claim."'
In Heaton v. United States,"0 the wife sued jointly with her
husband for loss of services and consortium based on a claim
signed only by her husband, seeking damages for his personal
injuries. The court held that her cause of action was independent,
separate, and distinct from the husband's personal injury claim.
Since only the husband had signed the claim for his injuries, the
court dismissed the wife's action, holding that the claim filed was
not sufficient notice to apprise the government of the wife's claims
for loss of services and consortium.'1 In Green v. United States"
it was held that the mother's right to damages, though dependent
on the daughter's right to recover, was personal to her and thus
required a separate claim.'" In Santoni v. United States" the hus-
band failed to file an administrative claim for his loss of con-
sortium. ' This failure required a dismissal since Maryland law
"Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
4528 C.F.R. § 14.3(c) (1978).
"6Van Fossen v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 1017, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
67 Heaton v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" Stokes v. United States, 444 F.2d 69, 70 (4th Cir. 1971).
6 Heaton v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 589, 590-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
70 383 F. Supp. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
71 Id. at 590-91.
72 385 F. Supp. 641 (S.D. Cal. 1974).
"Id. at 642-43.
7,450 F. Supp. 608 (D. Md. 1978).
'Id. at 609-10.
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provided that a claim for loss of consortium be instituted as a joint
action by both husband and wife. '
A Sum Certain
Not the least of the problems arises from the requirement that
the claim for money damages be in "a sum certain."" Inasmuch as
the filing of a proper administrative claim is an absolute prerequi-
site to the maintenance of a suit in the district court, 8 the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction if a claim is filed which fails to
state a sum certain." Thus, even where the amount stated in the
claim was for a sum "in excess of $50,000.00," the case was dis-
missed for failure to comply with the regulations." In College v.
United States,8 a claim was filed more than two years after the
accident in the sum of $172,495.52. Although a letter from plain-
tiff's counsel to the Air Force, written within the two-year period,
had notified the Air Force of the accident and injuries, it made
no mention of a sum certain. Noting that the FTCA and Air Force
regulations required the statement of a sum certain, the court
affirmed the dismissal, stating in part: "However, we believe the
regulation requiring that a claim be stated as a sum certain is
neither inconsistent with the statute nor unreasonable, . . and as
a valid expression of when a claim is considered to have been
presented is binding on the appellant."82 Thus failure to include
the amount claimed is a failure to comply with the regulation and
will result in dismissal.' Where a claimant, instead of stating a sum
certain, inserted the phrase "unknown at this time," the court held
there was a failure to comply with the regulations and hence the
76 Id. at 610.
7728 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976); 28 C.F.R. 5 14.2(a) (1978).
78 Three-M Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1977);
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1974);
Best Bearings Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1972).
7 Raymond v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
80 Id.
81572 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1978).
82 Id. at 454 (citations omitted).
m Allen v. United States, 517 F.2d 1328 (6th Cir. 1975); Melo v. United
States, 505 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1974); Avril v. United States, 461 F.2d 1090
9th Cir. 1972); Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1971);
Fallon v. United States, 405 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Mont. 1976).
84 Caton v. United States, 495 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1974).
1979]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
action did not meet the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C.
2676(a)."
In Allen v. United States" the claim was specific as to the prop-
erty damage claimed, but did not state a sum for the personal
injuries. The action, however, was brought only for the personal
injuries and loss of consortium. It was held it did not qualify as
a claim." In Robinson v. United States Navy" the court dismissed
an action in which the plaintiff had filed a claim, specifically stating
a property damage claim in the sum of $2,135.45 "plus personal
injury."" In Fallon v. United States" the claim filed requested "ap-
proximately $15,000." The court was unwilling to dismiss on this
technicality, stating:
Administrative claims should be so interpreted to prevent technical
and unjust results if such an interpretation can be applied without
thwarting the purpose which the regulation seeks to serve. Where
a claim filed with a federal agency contains definite figures ren-
dered uncertain by the use of qualifying words, there seems to be
no valid reason why the agencies and the courts cannot treat the
additional words as surplusage, leaving the certain amounts stated
as the claim. If a rule of interpretation requires the elimination of
the surplusage, and I hold that it does, then the claim here, so
interpreted, is certain."
The court, relying on language in Caton v. United States,"1 went
on to eliminate the word "approximately" so that the claim stated
a sum certain of $15,000. The action also had the effect of limit-
ing the recovery.
This result, however, conflicted with the earlier Robinson deci-
sion." If the rule in Fallon had been followed in the Robinson
case, the court would have recognized at least the claim for
$2,135.45 property damage. Interestingly, the court in Fallon
certified the issue for appeal as a controlling question of law,"2 but
85 517 F.2d 1328 (6th Cir. 1975).
16 Id. at 1329-30.
17 342 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
11 Id. at 383-84.
19 405 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Mont. 1976).
9Id. at 1322.
01 495 F.2d at 637-38.
92 Robinson v. United States Navy, 342 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
9328 U.S.C. S 1292(b) (1976).
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there is no record of an interlocutory appeal having been taken
by the government.
No Class Action Claims
The twin requirements of authorization and a sum certain also
preclude the filing of class action administrative claims. As pointed
out earlier, claims must be filed by the claimant or his authorized
agents or representatives." In a class action, very often the class is
undefined and unknown, thus the identity of claimants and the
specific damage suffered by each cannot be measured. Further,
each claimant is required to make his claim in a "sum certain."'5
A claim which merely states a final sum sought on behalf of a
class, however, does not state a sum certain for each of the un-
known members of the class. In Blain v. United States," a claim
was filed by one party [the Prestons] on their own behalf and
"other parties," alleging damage to property sustained by the
Prestons and "other parties in class action.""' The claim was denied
as to all parties as a class including the Prestons." Citing the
absence of individual claims by the owner of the property dam-
aged, or an authorized agent or legal representative, the court ruled
that no valid claim had been filed, and the jurisdictional require-
ment had not been met." This principle has also been applied to
family claims,1" and can be expected to preclude attempts at class
actions in multiple aviation accident litigation."'
Amending a Claim
The regulation also provides that claims may be amended prior
-28 C.F.R. § 14.3 (1978).
- 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (1978).
:0 552 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1977).
7 
7 d. at 290.
9, Id. The Prestons later instituted and settled their individual claim, but were
not parties to the pending action.
9Id. at 291; see also Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1977).1
"OHouse v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d at 617; see also note 13
supra.
101 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d
1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); Pan American World
Airways, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975);
Marchesi v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Causey
v Pan American World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Va. 1975); Hobbs
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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to any final agency action or prior to the exercise of the claimant's
option to sue under 28 U.S.C. 2675 (a).'" The regulation provides
that "[a] claim presented in compliance with paragraph (a) of
this section may be amended," and suggests that only valid claims
may be amended even after the two-year period for filing expires. It
is possible, however, that before the two-year limitation passes, and
before any agency action is taken, a claimant (or his attorney)
may discover that the claim is defective or a nullity because it
lacks a critical ingredient. Since a claim treated as a nullity would
be insufficient to support jurisdiction, it is feasible that another
(not an amended) claim could be filed as long as the two year
period had not expired. It also seems feasible that an otherwise
incomplete (invalid) claim could be amended, or at least made
complete, by providing supplementary information to be incor-
porated with the invalid claim, if the supplementary information,
when incorporated, completes the claim in compliance with the
regulation within the two years. Such incorporation by reference,
though not found, was recognized recently in House v. Mine Safety
Appliances Co.,' a multiple disaster mine case in which the court
stated, "Unless the incorporation of the Notice of Claim is effec-
tive, these claims are clearly incomplete."1'
Reconsideration
Once a claim has been denied, a request for reconsideration of
the claim may be made." The request must be made within the
original six-month period after denial and before any action is
started."6 When properly made, it will toll the original six-month
limitation period, until the government denies the request for
reconsideration and then another six-month period begins from
the date of the second denial letter.0" This procedure, however,
can only be used once.""
'0228 C.F.R. S 14.2(b) (1978).
103 573 F.2d 609 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Silver Dollar Mining Co.
v. PVO Int'l Inc., - U.S. , 99 S. Ct. 182 (1978).
101 Id. at 615.






Once a proper claim containing a sum certain has been filed,
the amount sought in the administrative claim is generally the
maximum for which suit may be brought, unless the increased
amount is based upon newly discovered evidence which was not
reasonably discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to the
federal agency, or upon allegation and proof of intervening facts.'
In Molinar v. United States"0 a claim letter dated October 19,
1971, was submitted in connection with an auto accident which
occurred March 2, 1970, without stating any amount, but had
attached medical bills in the sum of $1,462.50. In February, 1972,
the FAA sent four Form 95's (Claim for Damage or Injury), re-
questing they be completed and returned. This was done on May
4, 1972. On July 20, 1972, the FAA denied the claim and suit
was commenced on November 16, 1972. The plaintiff was awarded
$20,000. On appeal, the court held that enclosing medical bills
for a specific amount, i.e., $1,462.50, was a claim for a "sum
certain" and that three knee operations performed on the plain-
tiff were intervening facts justifying the award in excess of the
"sum certain" claimed. 1'
In another case, however, a plaintiff sought to amend his ad
damnum from the $250,000 sought in the claim to $500,000.
Although the court allowed the amendment, it ruled plaintiff
would not be allowed to recover more than the sum stated in the
claim unless newly discovered evidence of intervening facts could
be shown at trial.' In Kielwien v. United States'3 plaintiff filed
a claim in the sum of $25,000, and the court below, finding there
were intervening facts, awarded the sum of $123,578.90. The
circuit court found that the extent and permanency of plaintiff's
injuries were not based upon newly discovered evidence not rea-
sonably discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to the gov-
ernment."' The court distinguished this case from United States v.
1- 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (1976).
110 515 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1975).
SId. at 249-50.
1 Colin v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
113 540 F.2d 676 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
"4Id. at 681.
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Alexander,"' in which plaintiff filed a claim only six weeks after
the injury. In Kielwien, the plaintiff had filed the claim almost a
year after the injury. After comparing the facts with other cases
in which intervening facts were recognized, the court quoted ap-
provingly from Nichols v. United States:"
The statute, 28 U.S.C. §2675(b), would be meaningless if claim-
ants, after rejection of their claim, could institute actions for
amounts in excess of the claim filed merely because they, or their
attorneys, are of the opinion that the claim has a greater value
and that is about the extent of the proof of an 'intervening fact,
relating to the amount of the claim' in this case." '
The case was remanded to enter a judgment in accordance with
the amount claimed in the administrative claim."8 It appears that
each case in which attempts are made to sue for amounts in
excess of the sum claimed will be looked at separately to determine
if there are intervening facts or if there is newly discovered evi-
dence not reasonably discoverable at the time the claim is presented
to the government. The burden of establishing such newly discov-
ered evidence or intervening facts rests on the claimant-plaintiff.""
Time for Filing
As stated earlier, once the agency has denied or rejected the
claim, suit must be brought within six months of the date on the
denial letter."' If suits are brought after six months, they will be
dismissed as being barred by the statute of limitations. 2' One may
not file a lawsuit and hold it in abeyance until a claim is filed or
until the six months have gone by, for the court has no jurisdiction
over the action unless the conditions precedent, i.e., filing a proper
claim, and the passage of six months, have been met.' Thus, if
111238 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1956).
147 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Va. 1957).
"'Kielwien v. United States, 540 F.2d 676, 681 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 979 (1976).
I" Id. at 680-81.
"Id. at 680; Smith v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 152, 154 (D. Md. 1965).
' 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1978).
" Childers v. United States, 442 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
857 (1971); Claremont Aircraft Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 896 (9th Cir.
1969); Rodriguez v. United States, 382 F. Supp. I (D.P.R. 1974).
1' Best Bearings Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1972); Marano
v. United States Naval Hosp., 437 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1971); Walley
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a lawsuit is filed prior to filing an administrative claim, it will be
subject to a motion to dismiss; however, where there is sufficient
time, the suit can and should be discontinued without prejudice
to bringing the lawsuit after the statutory conditions precedent
have been met."'
Third Party Claims
Quite often, particularly in an aviation case, the plaintiff sues
an airline or manufacturer, who in turn files a third party com-
plaint against the United States. No administrative claim is re-
quired in order to implead the United States as a third party de-
fendant, or to file counterclaims or crossclaims.'" Merely because
the government has been impleaded by a co-tortfeasor does not
permit the plaintiff, ipso facto, to file an action against the govern-
ment without having filed an administrative claim and allowing six
months to elapse. Although the United States may be in the law-
suit, and discovery may ensue among all the parties, in order to
maintain an affirmative action against the United States, the same
jurisdictional requirements discussed above must be met. The ra-
tionale is that the provisions of section 2675(a) give the court
jurisdiction only over a third party claim, counterclaim or cross-
claim, but do not excuse the claim procedure where there is a
direct claim against the government.l"
Other Administrative Claims
Claimants seeking damages against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act are required to show that the damages
claimed occurred as a result of the negligence or wrongful conduct
of a government employee or agent acting in the scope of his em-
v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Driggers v. United States,
309 F. Supp. 1377 (D.S.C. 1970); Gutelius v. United States, 312 F. Supp. 51
(E.D. Va. 1970); Deavers v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 856 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
These requirements cannot be waived.
"'See Raymond v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
1 28 U.S.C. S 2675(a) (1978). Such an action may not be "instituted" upon
a claim against the United States which has been presented to a federal agency
unless the agency has made final disposition of the claim.
125 West v. United States, 592 F.2d 487, 490-91 (8th Cir. 1979); see also,
Rosario v. American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 531 F.2d 1227, 1230-34
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
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ployment.' 6 Some of the government's liability resulting from
military activities, however, has been seriously limited by the
exceptions to jurisdiction under the FTCA"' and decisions such
as Feres v. United States" which prevent servicemen from suing
when the injury or damage arises incident to the claimant's military
service. In other situations, negligence or misconduct may not have
played any part in causing the injury or damage. Examples are a
sudden and undetectable failure of an aircraft electrical system re-
sulting in the pilot's ejection and a crash causing injuries or dam-
ages on the ground, or the unexplained explosion of an ammunition
dump."'
To cover such contingencies the Congress enacted the Military
Claims Act,' whereby claims not to exceed $25,000 may be
settled and paid... by the Secretary of the service. There is no
limitation, however, on the amount which may be claimed, and
if the Secretary finds a claim in excess of $25,000 has merit, he
may pay the $25,000 within his authority and report and recom-
mend to Congress payment of the excess.' There is no appeal,
however, from the Secretary's determination. Each of the services
has promulgated regulations to be followed in submitting claims
of this type. Though the differences in the regulations among the
services are more procedural than substantive, they should be
consulted in each instance to assure compliance with the particular
service requirements, including choice of the proper claimant."
In addition to the Military Claims Act, Congress has enacted
the Foreign Claims Act,'' and a National Guard Claims Act."
12628 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1965).
12728 U.S.C. S 2680 (1976).
128340 U.S. 135 (1950).
129 JAYSON, supra note 6, at § 4.02.
130 10 U.S.C. § 2733, which covers domestic and foreign non-combat and non-
service related activities, unless covered by Foreign Claims Act.
" Initially the settlement limit was $5,000; in 1970 it was increased to
$15,000 and in 1974 it was raised to $25,000. 10 U.S.C. § 2733(a) (1976).
13 10 U.S.C. § 2733(d) (1976).
"For Air Force regulations see 32 C.F.R. 55 842.0 et seq., 842.40 et seq.
(1978); for Army regulations see 32 C.F.R. §§ 536.1 et seq., 536.12 et seq.
(1978); for Navy (and Marine) regulations see 32 C.F.R. § 750.1 et seq., 750.50
et seq. (1978).
'- 10 U.S.C. § 2734, covers non-combat activities in foreign countries but is
limited to inhabitants of foreign countries. Regulations are found at 32 C.F.R.
S 842.50 et seq. (1978).
1-32 U.S.C. § 715 (1976).
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Though the Coast Guard in peacetime is part of the Department
of Transportation,1" in times of war, or whenever the President
may direct, it operates as an arm of the Navy. Recent amendments
to the Military Claims Act permit coverage of claims arising out
of the non-combat activities of the Coast Guard as well as activi-
ties of other Defense Department employees,"'
Claims under any of the foregoing acts must be presented within
two years of the occurrence. In general, the Standard Form 95 can
be used, and should be supplemented at the time of filing by
as much supportive information as possible. The claims section of
the military service, made up of officers from the Judge Advocate
General Staff, will review the documents submitted. The amount
claimed, whether for injury or death, will be measured against
the judgments and verdicts rendered in the claimant's or decedent's
jurisdiction. As an example, let me cite a claim I submitted on
behalf of the parents of an honorably discharged Marine, separated
because of a disability, who was permitted free travel privileges
on MATS aircraft. During a summer recess, the former Marine,
then a college junior, was killed while traveling in Europe on a
C-141 Starlifter, when the aircraft crashed in Spain. Though pilot
negligence seemed apparent, no action was possible because it
arose in a foreign country." Thus a claim was filed under the
Military Claims Act. The decedent and his family lived in Cali-
fornia, and decedent had been attending school in California.
Supportive information included birth and death certificates, school
honor certificates, a copy of decedent's honorable discharge, service
citations, promotions and certificates, commendations from teach-
ers and professors, current grades, letters from employers, state-
ment of his current health, sympathy letters, and news articles.
Also included was a life table and the latest verdict and judgment
values (as available) pertaining to a like situation.
The settlement of such a claim, however, as a practical matter,
is based on the decision of the claimant to accept what is offered.
There are no lawsuits or appeals to be filed from the determination
of the Secretary, although unless otherwise barred, the filing of a
13649 U.S.C. § 1655 (1976).
137 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (1976).
138 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1976).
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claim under the Military Claims Act would not preclude a later suit
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.' It should be noted, however,
that presenting claims under the Military Claims Act will not toll
the statute of limitations for Federal Tort Claims Act purposes."
Summary
It has long been settled that the United States, as a sovereign,
is immune from suit except as it consents to be sued, and the
terms of such consent define the court's jurisdiction to entertain
the action." The procedures established under the FTCA are
strictly construed."' Thus the filing of a valid administrative
claim is an absolute prerequisite to maintaining a civil action
against the government for damage arising from a tortious occur-
rence due to the negligence of a federal employee,"' and if a plain-
tiff fails to allege that he satisfied the requirements established
under the FTCA, the complaint must be dismissed.1" A claimant
may not commence a court action, however, until the agency has
either denied the claim within the six-month period or a six-
month period has elapsed since the claim was filed and no action
has been taken."' By careful adherence to the statutes and regula-
tions, no attorney should have any major difficulty establishing the
jurisdictional prerequisites to an action under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.
139See Gaidys v. United States, 194 F.2d 762, 763-64 (10th Cir. 1952).
140 For a comprehensive discussion of the Military Claims Act, and similar
claims acts see JAYSON supra note 6, at SS 4.01-4.09; for claims under Inter-
national Agreements, 10 U.S.C. S 2734(a) and S 2734(b), see JAYSON, supra
note 6, at S§ 5.01-5.03.
41Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 501 (1967); United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047, 1048-49
(3d Cir. 1971).
142 Three-M Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1977);
Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 20 (3d Cir.
1975).
14 Best Bearings Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1972).
"'Lann v. Hill, 436 F. Supp. 463, 466 (W.D. Okla. 1977). But see Altman v.
Connally, 456 F.2d 1114, 1116 (2d Cir. 1972) (dismissal within discretion of
trial court).
"I Caton v. United States, 495 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1974).
